Partial Perspectives Situated in Epistemological Linguistic Perceptions: i.e.: What?

A recurring theme that appeared through the readings and in our exploratory this week was the psychological and rhetorical impact language had during the Enlightenment period. In Bizzell and Herzberg’s introduction to the Francis Bacon, they mention how Bacon treated “the art of communication (delivery) as the means by which knowledge is used and incorporated into social institutions” (738). In this regard, language is the foundation of communication that forms knowledge, and they argue that Bacon thought that the heuristic qualities of the writing process “are a means of investigating how our knowledge can be formulated in effective language” (739). The emphasis language has on epistemology carries into the Enlightenment period. Bizzell and Herzberg mention that many philosophers during this time “called for broad language reforms in an attempt to purify communication” (792). John Locke expanded on this connection between language and epistemology by arguing that there exists a correlation between words and ideas in which we connect words to mental perceptions and universal sensations (798). He argues the signifiers can be “culture-bound, communal, or even individual” (798). Because language acts as a signifier that produces a mental image in our minds, language should be consistent, and, according to Bizzell and Herzberg, “Locke proposed ways to purify language for philosophy” (799).

I found myself really attaching onto Locke’s notion of words being associated with perception, and I see the implications this has to the field of rhetoric. When discussing gold, Locke states, “no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another: whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain” (823). The problem this serves rhetoric is that communication does not exist in a bubble where the perceptions the speaker has in relations to a certain word carries over to the perceptions of the listeners. All audiences bring their own individualized, cultural, and worldly institutionalized ideologies and experiences to language, to communication, and, therefore, to rhetoric. So even though words exist within a pattern, as seen by the Ngram Viewer in our exploratory, words do not carry the same meaning across time, contexts, or even individuals. This reminds me of the conversation we had about Condit critiquing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s use of the “virtue” and how it lacked in meaning for Condit but could have encompassed meaning for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.

George Campbell takes Locke’s notion of language even further. Bizzell and Herzberg quote Campbell when Campbell agrees with Locke; Campbell states, “we really think by signs as well as speak by them” (900). So even though language is not stable or neutral, it is still our basis of communication and epistemology. Therefore, in Campbell’s philosophy of rhetoric, he insists, “it is of the utmost consequence to ascertain, with precision, the meanings of words, and, as nearly as the genius of the language in which one writes will permit, to make them correspond to the boundaries assigned by Nature to the things signified” (905). And taking it even further by situating rhetoric as an act of persuasion, Campbell uses Locke’s understanding of how language is used in persuasion within rhetorical discourse to develop “circumstances that are chiefly instrumental in operating on the Passions” (929). He takes language, agrees that because they are signifiers they should be as universal as possible, and then uses language to shape rhetoric, as found in Section V on page 929.

Our exploratory was an insightful exercise that demonstrated how language, which is crucial to Locke and Campbell, fluctuates over time. Logic, a term that was of paramount importance to Aristotle, was used very little from the 1500s to the 1750s. But Nature, a term that I did not originally perceive to be very important before conducting this research, was by far the most dominant term used. Furthermore, this term exists within several contexts. In the quote from Campbell I used above, words should take on the meanings that were “assigned by Nature” (905). Nature, in this context, holds agency. There are also several references to human nature across the texts, as if there is a universal existing state within humans that is assigned to all persons at birth. Not only does the uncovering of this word show how it signified different ideas, but it also makes a statement as to what was important and valued to the speakers of that time. (Unfortunately, this research only privileged published works—therefore, privileged speakers—but that is a conversation for another space and time and does not quite fit into this blog post.)

Though I can conceptually understand how language plays a large role in meaning making, which influences communication and, therefore, rhetoric, I am left with questions that I would like to investigate further. We saw first hand with Condit and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca that meaning attached to words is fluid and not obsolete. How does this understanding, rooted in Locke’s notion of perception and sensory signifiers, complicate our understanding of the rhetorical canon (both Aristotle’s canon and Campbell’s)? What words are we guilty of prescribing meaning to that may be different than the speaker intended, and how does this influence our teaching of rhetoric? Does our awareness of this problem enable us to work around it, or are we falling into what Harding (quoted by Haraway) refers to as a form of “successor science” (Haraway 187)? When (or will we ever) reach a point where we will have “an earth-wide network of connections, including the ability partially to translate knowledge among very different—and power-differentiated—communities,” and how does language, perceptions, and visual phenomena play a role (Haraway 187)?

• Bizzell, Patricia, and Bruce Herzberg. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 2nd ed., edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martins, 2001.
• Campbell, George. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 2nd ed., edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martins, 2001, 902-946. 
• Haraway, Donna J. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 1992. 183-202.
• Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 2nd ed., edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martins, 2001, 817-827.

Access to Weekly 3 presentation: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Abgf_OCFXAdM6G1sP2cwkeIzi7XOPHwUK5WBHT1c1gc/edit?usp=sharing