Kennedy’s speech is laden with purposeful repetition. Among others, the ideas of “free” and “freedom” appear frequently in the three-page speech, as does the phrase, “Let them come to Berlin” in two languages (Kennedy 1-3). However, there are also repetitions of phrases in nearly every paragraph, starting with two sets in the opening: “I am proud to come… and I am proud to visit… and to come here…” and “Your distinguished Mayor… your distinguished Chancellor…” In the second paragraph, likewise, the structure “Two thousand years ago, the proudest boast... Today… the proudest boast…” is repeated (1). This carries on with ideas of freedom (1-3), locations of “this city… this country… this great continent of Europe” (3), “separating” and “dividing” (3), and peace (3). In discussing the Signifying Monkey, Gates writes, “Repetition, with a signal difference, is fundamental to the nature of Signifyin(g)” (1556). In Kennedy’s speech, repetition reinforces the American ideologies of democracy and freedom while also functioning in some ways to express American patriotism. Although the two ideas are operating in very different cultural systems, both function to explore tension, Gates within the homonyms Signifyin’ and signifying within the American and Afro-American cultures (1552) and Kennedy with his prevailing concept of freedom, a word that, within the context of American democracy, cannot exist in a communist system of government. In both instances, repetition serves to highlight ideological meanings of certain words, although in different ways and for different reasons. Whereas Gates seems to be redefining a word in order to increase and explore the rhetorical power of African Americans, Kennedy uses similar techniques (of repetition) to combat an undesirable ideology in a manner that allows America to maintain its political, ideological, and rhetorical power.
The ideas present in Kennedy's speech also work to exclude
Communism as an acceptable ideology. Foucault identifies three systems of
exclusion in the excerpts we read this week: forbidden speech (desire),
reason/madness (1461-2), and the “will to truth” (1462). In recapping these,
Foucault writes that the first two systems are slowly moving towards the third
despite truth/falsity being the least frequently discussed (1463). Of this
third system, he also notes, “The will to truth, like other systems of
exclusion, rests on an institutional support; it is both reinforced and renewed
by a whole strata of practices…” (1463). In using repetition, Kennedy
simultaneously seems to occupy reason/madness and truth/falsity by positioning
American democracy as both the most reasonable system and the true system because
it endows the greatest chance for freedom. However, I don’t think either system
of exclusion truly captures Kennedy’s aim, which seems to be to promote the
American form of democracy. Muckelbauer, in discussing the function of power in
Foucault’s works, notes, “Power relations do not simply constrain subjects but
are precisely the things that produce them” (77). The intricate network of
power relations between German people and American/European occupants, between
confining communist systems of government and liberating democratic ones, between
the powerful American speaker (Kennedy) and the West Berlin people struggling to
maintain liberty simultaneously does what Foucault refers to as the discourse
subjectifying the speaker and the speaker subjectifying the discourse (1469). Kennedy’s
use of first-person pronouns waxes and wanes; at times, it is inclusive (of
Germany), at times, it is exclusive (of nations outside of America, and constantly,
of communism). The semiotic repetition reinforces the divide as well as the
ideologies Kennedy supports, to some degree.
When taken together, the lauding of American democracy, the
repetition of ideas and meanings, and Kennedy’s idea that “All free men,
wherever they may live, are citizens are Berlin” (3), creates what I find to be
a halfway disturbing interpretation. In the context of McGee’s rhetorical analysis
of Hitler, Kennedy seems to be attempting to create “the people.” McGee defines
“the people” as “a fiction dreamed by an advocate and infused with an
artificial rhetorical reality by the agreement of an audience to participate in
a collective fantasy” (240). Kennedy’s repetition of the ideas of “freedom” and
the cultural ideologies of American democracy could be read as an attempt to
construct a “political myth,” which is one component of “the people” (McGee 243).
Rhetorically speaking, Kennedy sought to unify the world through the democratic
half of Berlin, to create a democratic form of “the people” that were free of
communism’s failures and oppression. The formation of “the people” through
repetition of ideology and meaning complicates the very idea of “the people”:
while they are in some sense a rhetorical construct, “the people” Adolf Hitler
attempted to create are significantly different, culturally, than “the people”
Kennedy was attempting to create. Both cases involved a unification under
certain ideological concepts and an exertion of rhetorical power, but Kennedy’s
“the people” were all united under the idea of democracy rather than the idea
of the Aryan race.
Performing this analysis has elucidated several concepts
from the readings and complicated others. I understand to some capacity how
certain systems operate through rhetoric and how rhetoric can either reinforce
a dominant culture or work to subvert it. I also understand now that rhetorical
approaches (like repetition) can be used for very different aims. Although on
some level the principles of exclusion, “the people,” and signifyin(g) operate
through Kennedy’s speech, I feel none of them are perfectly embodied by it, or
by any piece of rhetoric. Still, I found it interesting to examine the way
these systems functioned outside of their author’s theories, and I think in applying
them, we can learn more about the ways they coincide, support, undermine, and
problematize one another. Just as certain phrases can work on contextual,
transtextual, and intertextual levels to create complexity and reinforce or
complicate meaning, so these systems can coincide with one another for a
unified purpose in the context of discourse outside of theory. This makes me
wonder how these ideologies not only shape how we receive rhetoric, but also
how we produce it, and with what devices. Although the authors of this week’s readings
this week operate on different cultural ideologies, their defiance of some and
adherence to others on some levels parallels Kennedy’s speech. I acknowledge
the difference in genre, but I also believe cultural affiliations had an
influence on these works and find myself wondering how those ideologies could
be identified intratextually.
Works Cited
Foucalt, Michael.
“From The Order of Discourse.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from
Classical Times to the Present, 2nd ed., edited by Patricia Bizzell and
Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, pp. 1460-1470.
Gates, Jr., Henry
Louis. “From The Signifying Monkey and
the Language of Signifyin(g): Rhetorical Difference and the Orders of Meaning.”
The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, 2nd
ed., edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001,
pp. 1551-1580.
Kennedy, John F. “Ich
bin Ein Berliner.” 26 Jun. 1963. Transcribed by Michael E. Eldenmuller.
Accessed 31 Oct. 2016.
McGee, Michael C.
“In Search of ‘The People’: A Rhetorical Alternative.” The Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 61, no. 3, Nov. 1975, pp.
235-249.
Muckelbauer,
John. “On Reading Differently: Through Foucault’s Resistance.” College English, vol. 63, no. 1, Sept.
2000, pp. 71-94.
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