As seen through Bizzell and Herzberg, Foucault argues that knowledge and truth are not discoverable, meaning that truth and knowledge do not exist in the world awaiting discovery or realization. What Foucault calls will to truth is his critique on “the desire to locate truth in something other than discourse itself” (Bizzell and Herzberg 1432). Foucault argues that knowledge and truth are produced through discourse—discourse is the object of desire (1461). He states, “discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (1461). With this perception, discourse is no longer merely a medium for which truth or knowledge is translated once discovered; discourse is the discovering (or producing) agent. Discourse is the site of production for truth and knowledge.
Of course, Foucault complicates this notion and situates discourse through the power structures upheld through societ[ies]. He conceptualizes this through the internal procedures, which “[control] and [delimit] discourse” (1464). There are rules to discourse for each society, and Foucault uses disciplines as a principle of limitation: “a discipline is defined by a domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments” (1466). Disciplines are “inscribed on a certain type of theoretical horizon….are made up of errors as well as truths….[and] pushes back a whole teratology of knowledge beyond its margins” (1466). He states, “discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse” (1467). Furthermore, through complicating this notion of disciplines—which are already prescribed to certain rules and structures—Foucault argues there are procedures that control discourse through access. He states, “not all regions of discourse are equally open and penetrable”; furthermore, there are constraints of discourse that “limit its powers, those which master its aleatory appearances, those which carry out the selection among speaking subjects” (1467). Therefore, if discourse produces knowledge and truth for societies, but discourse itself is both controlled and confined by certain disciplines and power relations that determine who can and cannot participate in discourse, knowledge and truth that are produced through discourse is a large rhetorical act situated in power structures and hegemony.
John Muckelbauer both makes Foucault’s theories clearer and more complicated. In regards to producing truth, Muckelbauer analyzes and theorizes Foucault’s arguments. Muckelbauer states, “In ‘The Order of Discourse’ Foucault writes that for a statement to be true for a given discourse, it must be subject to a number of criteria within that discourse” (82). Muckelbauer refers to the conformity of the criteria as discursive codes: “a statement must conform to a number of determinable criteria in order for it to become truth within a particular field. Truth, then, is understood as the product of multiple discursive codes and multiple disciplining codes and practices to that field” (82). However, even within these codes there are power structures that control them. Muckelbauer argues, “in order to produce truth in a particular field, one must encounter the specificity of multiple power relations” (82).
Using Mackelbauer’s analysis of Foucault’s theories, I was better able to understand how John F. Kennedy’s (JFK) speech to the people of West Berlin in 1963 was so rhetorically successful. By doing a discourse analysis of JFK’s speech, Amanda and I were able to discover some of the discursive codes he used. Muckelbauer analyzes Foucault’s books and states they “have a certain resonance with truth and its influential cultural force” (83). But they are more than just a historical perspective (as we can also see with JFK’s speech); Mackelbaurer argues, “By engaging with the material of historical discourse and producing a narrative form that material, Foucault’s books resonate with elements of a truth discourse.” (83). JFK uses a historical narrative as well to form a truth discourse, as seen in our exploratory. Furthermore, and we can again see this evident in JFK’s speeches, Muckelbauer states, “[Foucault] claimed to use this discursive strategy not to advance disciplinary knowledge, but to have an impact on specific political situations in which he was interested” (83). Our discourse analysis of JFK has many parallels to Muckelbauer’s analysis of Foucault. JFK was of a particular political stance—he had political power as the President of the United States and was able to participate in the discourse because of this power structure. Furthermore, he was able to participate in the discourse in Germany because of the U.S.’s occupation in West Berlin at this time, due to the U.S. being victors in WWII. JFK did not have the same participatory rights speaking in East Berlin in 1963 since he did not have access as an “enemy” of the Soviet Union. The power structures of that society prevented discourse from JFK occurring.
The codes JFK used can also be articulated through Muckelbauer’s language. Muckelbauer defines discursive codes as “a particular style of appearance, a style of fiction, but one that maintains its own specificity” (84). We see this in JFK’s speech by his repetition of words to create a feeling of inclusion; his repeated references to “18 years,” which was when the U.S. won the war against Germany, but these references bring the people of West Berlin into the victory; and his focus on patriotism and nationalism that elicit feeling of power and hope. However, his speech was not to make the people of West Berlin feel like victors or even as a way to repair relationships that were severed through the first two world wars—his speech was to promote democracy (and capitalism) by tearing down Communism and making the Soviet Union the enemy. His discursive codes, functioning within the discipline of political speeches and the power structures that allowed JFK access to the discourse, produced truth by drawing on what people of West Berlin already saw as true: The Soviet Union built a wall that separates you from your families—the Soviet Union is Communist—this is Communism’s fault—Communism is bad—the opposite of Communism is Democracy—Democracy is good—the U.S. is a democracy that relates and feels for you and your struggles—therefore, the U.S. is good and we are against Communism and you should be too. His discursive codes and practices sound like a lot of inductive reasoning. However, he was successful. People of West Berlin (as a majority, this blog post does not get into Muckelbauer’s multiplicity of audiences due to space limits) took to JFK’s speech and accepted it as truth.
Though there were a lot of connections made through our discourse analysis and Foucault and Muckelbauer’s scholarship, there are still inconsistencies and questions. For example, since JFK’s speech was transnational (U.S. President speaking to a German society), how could we view his power structures and influences differently since the culture of the speaker is not the same as the culture of the audience? I am wondering how the U.S. (and France and Britain) occupancy in Germany, specifically West Berlin, for 18 years prior to this speech has cultural implications. A further analysis in to how culture influences discourse and discourse’s ability to produce knowledge and truth would help me understand this further, but I am also aware that it is not that simple (again, I will reference Muckelbauer’s multiplicity of audiences even though I am not going to unpack it here).
I am also interested in production itself. Foucault states, “in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (1461). I took this to mean that production of discourse is controlled by the powers structures of society. However, what defines production? Is production the act of invention, meaning—if we were taking JFK’s speech as an example—production occurs through the formulation, writing, revising of the actual speech? Or does production of discourse occur during performativity, when the discourse is given to the audience? Since Foucault argues that truth and knowledge are formed through discourse and not as a will-to-truth, does the position production as occurring when the discourse is spoken (or read) by audiences, since production of knowledge/truth occurs through audience engagement?
This is a long blog post, but I am very interested in these works (even though I am left with several questions).
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