Schema as a Generative Tool: Connecting Concepts with the New Rhetoric

Katelyn and I worked together to develop a schema for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of rhetorical argumentation. Creating the schema was no small task. Although I like mapping ideas and key concepts and find visual representations facilitate my learning, I often struggle to move those representations beyond the scope of an outline. A schema is, of course, more nuanced than that, and understandably more intellectually challenging. That being said, the result of developing a schema for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of rhetorical argumentation was far more valuable than any reading outline could have been.  Katelyn and I met in person to decide on what concepts and terms we wanted to include on our schema and how we wanted to represent them. At first, we were largely pulling out key terms and definitions, but then our conversation evolved into larger questions and concepts, including “What is the new rhetoric and is it really new?,” “How Aristotelian is this theory in actuality?,” and “In what ways is  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s understanding of audience and adherence change the scope of rhetoric?” As we thought about these concepts, Katelyn sketched a preliminary draft of our schema using pen and paper. After making some tweaks and collaboratively mapping other theorists onto our schema, I translated it into Prezi, a tool chosen for it’s open composing space, ability to edit collaboratively, and easy of sharing and circulating.  While composing the schema did not necessarily offer us answers to our questions, it did operate as a generative tool for thinking beyond what the text alone offers.

The initial work of developing the schema did help me to make sense of the moving parts of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory.  In particular, I think I better understand the role of context both for the text itself and in their theory of argumentation. When I viewed the text itself within its situational context. I was better able to see how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are attempting to revitalize and capture an aspect of rhetorical study that they perceive is lost or neglected. As Katelyn wrote, they are speaking within a particular context that no longer values the study of rhetoric (1386). Because of this social and political climate, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca need to validate the study of argumentation as a means of understanding value judgments, which by their “very nature eludes the methods of the mathematical and natural sciences” (1377). Attending to this context enabled me to better grasp the exigence for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory, and why they structure their theory the way they do. Additionally, context plays a significant role in their theory of argumentation. They view rhetoric as situational and fluid: “A general rhetoric cannot be fixed by precepts and rules laid down for once and for all. But it must be able to adapt itself” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1401). While their theory outlines several categories of argumentation, they acknowledge that these methods are variable and must be adapted to the particular context and audience, which, again, is shaped by social and political contexts (1378). This line of thinking aligns—to a certain extent--with Bitzer’s understanding of the rhetorical situation. Bitzer writes, “Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, objects, and exigence which strongly invites utterance” (5). While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not place emphasis on the situation in the way that Bitzer does, they do see context as a vital part of understanding and using rhetoric. Edbauer (now Rice) also sees rhetoric as fluid and situational in her ecological model. She situates rhetoric within its “temporal, historical, and lived fluxes” and explains that we cannot isolate discourse from its ecological context (9). Again, although I would not say that every part of Bitzer and Edbauer’s theories align with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s, I do think they would agree that context is an important part of the study of rhetoric.

The schema also afforded me the opportunity to consider the connections between Aristotle and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. Although they largely drew their theory from Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric, there were actually several points of opposition between the two. One of the biggest points of dissonance for me was in determining the effectiveness of rhetoric. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca claim that the effectiveness of rhetorical argumentation is determined by the audience: “the worth of an argumentation is not measured solely by its efficacy but also by the quality of the audience at which it is aimed” (1393). Aristotle, on the other hand, places the burden of efficacy on the speaker. He explains that because people have a natural tendency towards truth, if the rhetoric is not efficacious, “the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves” (180). Another point of contention is in the notion of truth. Aristotle clearly believes that there is such a thing as truth, and that it is a speaker’s responsibility to know the truth and bring others closer to it (156). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, however, do not adhere to the notion of absolute of objective truth.  They state, “men and groups of men adhere to opinions of all sorts with a variable intensity,” and that reasonable men can come to disagree and both be right (1376). Yet, regardless of these differences, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do revitalize Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric as persuasion in a time when rhetoric was mostly attributed to ornamentation and style. 

There are certainly other connections that we made between the “new rhetoric” and the other readings from this course so far, but I’ll leave that to our class discussion.

Works Cited

Aristotle. “Rhetoric.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 
            2nd ed., edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martins, 2001, 179-
            240.

Bitzer, Lloyd F. “The Rhetorical Situation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1.1 (Jan 1968): 1-14.

Edbauer, Jenny. “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to 
            Rhetorical Ecologies.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35.4, 2005

Perelman, Chaim, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. “The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical 
            Reasoning.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 2nd 
            ed., edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martins, 2001, 1372-1409.