In creating our outline for the schema,
Michael and I first sought to find the common factors we both
resonated with in New Rhetoric. We gravitated towards different
aspects, and it was interesting to see how we built upon each other's
concepts. This was a unique experience in that we were attempting to
make the textual presentation into a visual one while also
conceptualizing items we would not naturally link with other
elements. Michael and I decided to create a web (or as I originally
visualized it, a flat map that spread indefinitely on a digital
plane) linking key components of New Rhetoric to each other in order
to discover connections. To me, the lack of certain connections I
thought were evident was the most striking aspect of this.
Because both Perelman and Dearin link
New Rhetoric's concepts with Kant, I felt it was necessary to include
him in our schema. Dearin points out that, in opposition of the
positivists, Kant sparked the ideas that Bergson would build upon
which, in turn, helped form the foundation of New Rhetoric (353).
However, when Perelman mentions Kant, he uses him as an antithesis.
Kant proved difficult to meaningfully place in our schema because of
this, though, philosophically, I believe he is an important factor in
New Rhetoric's formulation. The same problem arose when we linked
Aristotle to the schema, as well. Also foundational, his philosophy
is difficult to contextualize among the tenants of New Rhetoric as
there is so huge a gap caused by over 2,000 years of thought. I
envisioned Aristotle appearing more dominate and creating more of a
presence in the big picture of the schema both because of his domain
and because Perelman cites him so often, but he only represented a
few connections once we were done mapping our concepts out. Some of
this is a reflection of the flat-mapping our schema takes the form
of, yet in creating a conceptualization of New Rhetoric, I now
realize how small the Aristocratic base is in the big picture. I am
afraid I have to respectfully disagree with Amanda's point about New
Rhetoric being deceptively named-- to me, at least, the divide
between Aristotle and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's framework is
made even larger after this exercise. This, too, makes Condit's call
for a “newer course for a “[N]ew [R]hetoric” seem like a more
likely and reasonable evolution (97).
As our schema came together and more
connections were fleshed out, I noticed myself focusing on the
“Evolution” section we created to consider how New Rhetoric
transformed rhetoric and philosophy. Of course, Condit was at the
center of this focus. Her note that Perelman is “an interesting
relic of an earlier time” and “reeks of forms of elitist and
sexist discourse” struck a chord, and that thought dominated the
majority of that area of our schema more so than I originally
imagined (96). Condit voiced several of my concerns with New
Rhetoric, but I have the advantage of looking back from almost six
decades after it was initially presented and viewing it through the
eyes of a modern scholar. Still, the social implications that Condit
discusses resonate strongly. One of the most alluring aspects of
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's framework is the appeal of widening
the audience of philosophy and rhetoric—Michael and I made this a
large aspect of our schema—but the gender and social biases Condit
discusses made this area of our mapping feel disconnected from what
Perelman originally claims the intent was. I think this was reflected
in our final draft, as well. When Condit notes that Perelman probably
specifically framed New Rhetoric to not include “the common people”
and his original approach to audience was more than just a relic of
his time (98), the original disconnect I felt became more evident.
No comments:
Post a Comment